Opting Out in the Name of God: Will Lawyers Be Compelled to Handle Same-Sex Divorces? by Piatt, Bill
Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship
2016
Opting Out in the Name of God: Will Lawyers Be
Compelled to Handle Same-Sex Divorces?
Bill Piatt
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information,
please contact jlloyd@stmarytx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bill Piatt, Opting Out in the Name of God: Will Lawyers Be Compelled to Handle Same-Sex Divorces?, 79 Alb. L. Rev. 683 (2016).
OPTING OUT IN THE NAME OF GOD: WILL LAWYERS BE
COMPELLED TO HANDLE SAME-SEX DIVORCES?
Bill Piatt*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2015 the Supreme Court of the United States determined,
by a 5-4 ruling in the case of Obergefell v. Hodges,' that same-sex
couples have a constitutionally guaranteed right to marry.2 Soon
thereafter, a same-sex couple applied for a marriage license in Rowen
County, Kentucky. 3 Kim Davis, the Rowen County clerk refused to
issue the license, citing her own religious beliefs.4 The couple brought
suit against Ms. Davis, and she was ordered by a federal district
judge to issue the license.5 When she refused, she was held in
contempt, and jailed for five days.- Ultimately U.S. District Judge
David Bunning ordered Ms. Davis' deputies to issue the license in her
stead.' Ms. Davis' actions brought her a great deal of notoriety.8
Some of the publicity was positive with her actions being
characterized "heroic," while others considered her to be a
"homophobe," or a "Hitler."9 While certainly dramatic, Ms. Davis'
case was not the first time in recent history that courts or
administrative bodies have imposed sanctions against citizens or
* Professor of Law and former Dean (1998-2007), St. Mary's University School of Law. I
would like to thank my research assistants, Alicia Stoll, Sean Cohen, and Haben Tewelde. I
would also like to thank Maria Vega for her line editing and technical assistance.
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2 Id. at 2607.
3 See Miller v. Davis, No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015).
4 Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *4, *15.





9 See Amita Kelly, Kim Davis' Supporters, In Their Own words: 'Courageous,"Heroic,'NPR
(Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/09/26/443485200/courageous-
heroic-meet-kim-daviss-supporters; Emily Shapiro, Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis Tells ABC News




private business operators who declined to provide goods or services
to same-sex couples.10
In 2013, the Supreme Court of New Mexico considered a matter
involving a photographer who had declined to photograph the
commitment ceremony of one woman to another." The
photographer, Elaine Huguenin, indicated that she was "personally
opposed to same-sex marriage and will not photograph any image or
event that violates her religious beliefs."1 2 The customers filed a
discrimination complaint against the photographer with the New
Mexico Human Rights Commission. 13  They alleged that the
photographer had engaged in discrimination that violated the
provisions of the New Mexico Human Rights Act. 14 The Act precludes
discrimination by public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation. 15 The New Mexico Human Rights Commission ruled
against the photographer.16 The photographer appealed, asserting
that her constitutionally-protected First Amendment rights to the
free exercise of her religion and expression allowed her to decline to
participate in the event.17  A state district judge granted the
customer's motion for summary judgment.18 The New Mexico Court
of Appeals affirmed the ruling against the photographer and in favor
of her customers, as did the Supreme Court of New Mexico.19
Also in 2015, the Bureau of Labor and Industries of the State of
Oregon considered a case involving a baker who declined to make a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple.20 The Commissioner determined
that the bakery owners had violated the Oregon statute prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of sexual
orientation. 21 In addition, the Commissioner awarded money
damages to the complainants in the total sum of $135,000, signifying
compensatory damages for emotional, mental, and physical suffering
10 See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 1 79, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M.
2013); State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 94248, *17 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Jan. 7, 2015).
11 Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040, 1 1, 309 P.3d at 59.
12 Id. at 1 7, 309 P.3d at 59-60.
13 Id. at 1 9, 309 P.3d at 60.
14 Id.
15 Id. at ¶ 1, 309 P.3d at 58.
16 Id. at 1 9, 309 P.3d at 60.
17 Id. at 1 10, 11, 309 P.3d at 60.
1s Id. at 1 10, 309 P.3d at 60.
19 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 10, 309 P.3d at 59, 60 (citing Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2012-NMCA-
086, 1 1, 284 P.3d 428, 432 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012)).
20 Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL 4868796, at *24 (Or. Bureau of Lab. &
Indus. July 5, 2015).
21 Id. at *16.
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resulting from the denial of service. 22
These are but a few of the cases which have been brought against
public officials and private individuals who have declined to provide
services in the manner described so far. 2 3 Undoubtedly, more will
follow. As Chief Justice Roberts notes in his dissenting opinion in
the Obergefell case:
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in
ways that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-
sex marriage-when, for example, a religious college provides
married student housing only to opposite-sex married couples,
or a religious adoption agency declines to place children with
same-sex married couples. Indeed, the Solicitor General
candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some
religious institutions would be in question if they opposed
same-sex marriage. There is little doubt that these and
similar questions will soon be before this Court.24
The cases which have arisen so far, and the observations by Chief
Justice Roberts, raise an important issue for lawyers. Is it possible
that attorneys who decline on religious grounds to provide legal
services to same-sex individuals seeking divorces will be ordered to
provide that representation? Might those attorneys be sanctioned if
they fail to do so? An analysis of these issues will involve an
examination of the lawyer's role as both a private practitioner and
also as an officer of the court. It will involve a discussion as to
whether legal services are "public accommodations" for purposes of
human rights acts. It will require an examination of legal ethics rules
and principles. It will necessitate examination of the power of courts
to order attorneys to represent clients. And, of course, it will require
an examination of the constitutional and statutory protections
afforded to the religious beliefs and practices of attorneys. These are
novel and difficult questions, but they are questions that will
undoubtedly be raised. Attorneys need to consider them before the
questions arise in their practices.
Before examining the potential obligations of attorneys in this
22 Id. at *23.
23 See, e.g., Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 2015 COA 115, 1 45 (Colo. App. 2015)
("We conclude that the Commission's order merely requires that [defendant] not discriminate
against potential customers in violation of [Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act] and that such
conduct, even if compelled by the government, is not sufficiently expressive to warrant First
Amendment protections."); State v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 94248,
at *3, *17 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015) (ruling against a florist who was sued for not
providing services to a same-sex wedding).
24 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625-26 (2015) (citations omitted).
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controversy, we turn first to a brief exploration of the right of
Americans to "opt out" of performing what otherwise would be a legal
duty when their religious beliefs preclude that participation. We
must also consider limitations on that right. Obviously, emotions run
high, as do political considerations, on all sides of this current debate.
It might be helpful from the outset, however, to recognize that this is
not the first time in American history that we have witnessed a clash
between religious beliefs and government duties imposed in a highly-
charged environment. 2 5  The cases are voluminous, and an
examination of each is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless,
we turn to a brief attempt to understand some of this history by
quickly considering some areas where religiously-based
conscientious objections have been raised to government mandates.
A. A Right to Opt Out?
1. The Draft
Kim Davis is not the first person from Kentucky to be cast into the
national spotlight for refusing to perform a government-required
duty because of a religious objection to it. On October 1, 2015, Sports
Illustrated inaugurated its Muhammad Ali Legacy Award in Ali's
Kentucky hometown. 26 Ali was not always regarded in such a
positive light. In the Olympic games of 1960, Ali, who was then
known by his birth name of Cassius Clay, Jr., won the gold medal in
the 175-pound division.27 Four years later he defeated Sonny Liston
and became the heavyweight champion of the world. 28 Clay's victory
was surprising, because of his decided underdog status in that fight.2 9
He stunned the country again by announcing two days after the fight
that he had become a member of the Nation of Islam. 30 Then on
March 6, 1964, he announced that hereafter he would be known as
Muhammad Ali.3 1
Over the course of the next four years, Ali successfully defended his
25 See discussion infra Part I.A.
26 Tim Layden, The Legacy: The Greatest is Still an Inspirational Force, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 5, 2015, at 61, 62, 64.
27 Thomas Hauser, Muhammad Ali: American Boxer, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
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crown against numerous opponents. 32 However, 1967 found this
country in the midst of the Vietnam War and an increasingly
unpopular mandatory draft. 33 On April 28, 1967, Ali refused to be
inducted into the armed forces of the United States. 34 He cited his
religious belief as the basis.3 5 Ali's religious claim was made even
more controversial by his acknowledgment that while he would fight
in an Islamic holy war, he would not fight for the United States in
Vietnam. 36 At the time, "conscientious objectors" would only qualify
for exemption if they stated that their religious beliefs precluded
them from participating in any war. 3 7
Ali's administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board was
denied and the case ultimately reached the Supreme Court of the
United States. 38 The Court agreed with Ali.39 He went on to regain
the title that had been stripped from him as a result of his refusal to
participate in the draft, but he had lost four years, perhaps the best
four years, of his career.40
It is important not to understate the intensity of the debate that
raged around this case. While the Kim Davis matter has attracted
national attention and controversy, at the time of the Ali matter, the
country was involved in the increasingly unpopular Vietnam War.
College campuses were in turmoil and demonstrations rocked the
country.41 Yet, the Supreme Court upheld the religious based
conscientious exemption, and applied it to allow a very high profile
sports combatant to decline to participate in military combat.4 2 And
Ali's case was not the only situation where the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of a religious or ethically based objection to
induction into the draft.43
32 Id.
33 Vietnam War Protests, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-
war/vietnam-war-protests (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
34 Hauser, supra note 27.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971) ("In order to qualify for classification as a
conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show that he is
conscientiously opposed to war in any form." (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 443
(1971))); Hauser, supra note 27.
38 See Clay, 403 U.S. at 700.
3 See id. at 705.
40 See Hauser, supra note 27.
41 See Student Antiwar Protests and the Backlash, PBS (Sept. 22, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlamex/twodays/peopleevents/e-antiwar.html.
42 See Clay, 403 U.S. at 700-01, 705.
43 See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-344 (1970); United States v. Seeger,




The cases recognizing a religious exemption for workers in various
contexts are voluminous, and are based not only on statutory
concerns but on the First Amendment's Free Exercise of Religion
Clause. 4 4 Illustrative of the latter is the case of Sherbert v. Verner.45
In Sherbert, a claim by a Seventh-Day Adventist for workers
compensation benefits in the State of South Carolina was denied.46
South Carolina barred workers from receiving benefits who failed,
"without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when
offered." 4 7 The worker had refused, because of her religion, to take a
job which would have required her to work on Saturdays. 48 The Court
concluded that, "[g]overnmental imposition of such a choice puts the
same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine
imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." 49 Ultimately,
the Court determined that disqualification of her benefits imposed a
non-constitutionally permissible burden on the free exercise of her
religion.50
On the other hand, in a 1990 case, the Supreme Court determined
that the state of Oregon could criminalize even the religiously
inspired use of peyote.51 It could deny unemployment benefits to
employees who were discharged for possession of that drug, even in
the face of their claims that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment protected those activities. 52 This case, however, served
as impetus three years later for the enactment of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 53 discussed below.
In addition to constitutional protections raised in employment
issues, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196454 provides in part that
it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
44 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.").
4 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46 Id. at 399-401, 410.
7 Id. at 400-01 (alteration in original).
48 Id. at 399-400.
49 Id. at 404.
5o Id. at 410.
51 See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
52 Id.
5 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993); Holt v.
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 253, 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2014)).
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."5 5 In 1972, Congress included the following definition: "The
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he
is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective
employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship
on the conduct of the employer's business."5 6 Courts have reached
often conflicting decisions in the application of these provisions.5 7
And the provisions do not extend to government officials.58
A case considered by the Supreme Court in 2015 involved the issue
of whether a private business can prohibit an employee who practices
the Muslim faith from wearing religiously-compelled attire to her
job.59 The case was remanded.6 0 When that case is ultimately
decided, we might have additional guidance on the extent of the right
of employees to opt out of work regulations, and the accommodations
which might be required of employers when religious issues arise in
the workplace.
3. School Attendance
In 1972 the Supreme Court of the United States considered the
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder.61 Yoder refused to send his school-age
children to the Wisconsin public schools in violation of a statute
requiring such attendance. 62 He argued that his church, Old Order
Amish, precluded such public school participation beyond the eighth
grade. 63 The Supreme Court agreed that his conviction and the five
dollar fine imposed upon him for his noncompliance with the statute
violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. 64
55 § 703, 78 Stat. at 255.
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (j) (2014).
57 See Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII's
Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. Soc. POI'Y & L. 453, 467-69
(2010).
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (f) ("[T]he term 'employee' shall not include any person elected to
public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the
policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional
or legal powers of the office.").
59 EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015).
6o Id. at 2034.
61 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62 Id. at 207.
6 Id.
64 Id. at 208, 234.
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4. Religious Practice Involving Animal Slaughter
Animal sacrifice is part of the practice of the Santeria religion. 65 In
1993 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a Florida
city's ban on "ritual slaughter" which precluded members of the
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye from practicing their religion by
slaughtering goats within the city limits.6 6
5. Taxation
Not all claims of religious liberty allow an individual to opt out of
performing a government-imposed duty. In the case of United States
v. Lee,67 the Supreme Court denied to an Amish employer an
exemption from compulsory participation in the Social Security
system.68 The employer alleged that such participation violated his
free exercise of religion protections.69 The Court later determined in
1990 that a religious organization would not be allowed to refuse to
pay the general sales tax regarding the distribution of religious
products and religious literature. 70
6. Individuals in Government Custody or Control
Inmates have been allowed to exercise dietary and grooming
choices, which would otherwise be prohibited, when those inmates
demonstrate a religious reason for those choices pursuant to the First
Amendment. 7' In the military, however, members of the armed
services do not have the right to opt out of the dress code regulations
based on a free exercise objection. 72
7. Government Mandated Provision of Contraception-RFRA
The Congress of the United States enacted the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010.73 In general, that Act mandates
65 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 525 (1993).
66 Id. at 527-28, 547, 550, 551.
61 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
68 Id. at 261.
69 Id. at 257.
7o Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392, 397 (1990).
71 See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 861, 863, 867 (2015) (holding prison grooming
policy substantially burdened practicing Muslim prisoner's free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment).
72 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986).
73 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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that employers with fifty or more full-time employees must offer a
group health insurance plan that provides "minimal essential
coverage."74 In regulations implementing the Act, the United States
Department of Health Human Services required employers to
provide contraception under the statute, but exempted certain
religious non-profit organizations from them.75 A private employer
which did not meet the definition of a religious nonprofit nonetheless
challenged the provisions of the Act.76 The owners of the company
believed that life begins at conception and some contraception pills,
which were required to be provided by the government, resulted in a
termination of the pregnancy after conception had occurred.77 Being
required to provide these pills, they felt, violated their religious
beliefs.78 In deciding the case, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled for the private business owners.79
The Court determined that the applicable regulations violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.80 The Court noted that
the RFRA was enacted three years after the decision of the Supreme
Court in Employment Division v. Smith, cited above.81 Congress
enacted the RFRA to provide additional religious safeguards against
government action which infringes upon religious belief.82 The Court
noted that the RFRA provides that, "[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability." 8 3 The Court noted that
if the government substantially burdens a person's exercise of
religion under the Act, that person is entitled to an exemption from
the rule unless the government "demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling government interest." 84  The Court
concluded that there were many other ways that the government
could ensure that women have access to contraception without
mandating that it be provided by business owners over their religious
74 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (a), (c)(2)(A) (2014).
75 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015).
76 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
77 Id. at 2764-65.
78 Id. at 2765.
79 Id. at 2785.
so Id.
81 Id. at 2760.
82 Id. at 2761.
83 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).




On a similar note, another case has worked its way up to be heard
by the Supreme Court in the upcoming Term. That case, Little
Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell,86 involves a challenge by a Catholic
order of nuns.87  The nuns had declined not only to provide
contraception to their employees, but refused to sign the proposal by
the government to authorize a private insurer to issue the
contraception in the name of the Little Sisters.88
Note that following the enactment of the federal RFRA, states
enacted similar versions.89 However, these typically only provide
protection against action by a government.90 Thus in the Elane
Photography case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the
state's RFRA law did not apply because the government was not a
party.91
8. Polygamy
In our last quick examination of some of the areas where individual
religious beliefs have clashed with government policy, we return to
the subject of marriage. In the case of Reynolds v. United States,92
the Supreme Court of the United States determined, over religious
objections, that individuals do not have a constitutional right to
practice polygamy. 93 This case was decided before the enactment of
the RFRA.94 Undoubtedly the result would be the same even in the
post-RFRA environment. Kim Davis' counterparts could lawfully be
sanctioned not only for refusing to issue marriage licenses to same-
sex couples, but they could be sanctioned under state law for
providing licenses to multiple parties within the same marriage, even
if the clerks' religious beliefs or those of the applicants permitted or
even required polygamy.95
85 Id. at 2759.
86 Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir.), cert.
granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 446 (2015).
87 Id. at 1167.
88 See id. at 1167-68, 1170.
89 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-6 (West 2015).
90 Id. § 28-22-3.
91 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 1 4, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013).
92 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
93 Id. at 166-67.
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2014); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
95 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-2, 30-1-16 (LexisNexis 2015).
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B. The Role of Lawyers in Same-Sex Divorces
The discussion of the situations where courts have had to decide
whether, and to what extent, an individual's religious beliefs permit
that person to opt out of compliance with what otherwise would be a
government-imposed obligation could be quite lengthy. Nonetheless,
it is apparent that while not absolute, the individual right to the free
exercise of religion provides an important opportunity to refrain from
compliance with many government mandates. 96 Without detailing
all of these circumstances, it is apparent that our system recognized
an important balance. While "government" necessarily requires that
people be governed, there are limits. The free exercise of religion is
valued and respected, even to the point of excusing the performance
of duties that otherwise would be compelled. Of course, that freedom
is not unlimited. These principles serve as the backdrop as we now
turn our attention to an area which could potentially affect the
readers of this article in their practices and in their judicial
determinations. Will lawyers be required to provide legal services,
over their religious objections, to individuals seeking same-sex
divorces?
Nobody enters into a marriage expecting that it will end in divorce.
Yet the cold hard reality is that approximately half of all marriages
will end that way.97 There is no reason to believe that same-sex
marriages will be any different. Indeed, even before Obergefell, while
same-sex couples could not marry in Texas, some same-sex couples
who had recently married elsewhere sought to obtain divorces in
Texas.98 Undoubtedly, many of the same-sex couples who celebrate
the newly-acquired right to marry by contracting for the services of
wedding planners, florists, photographers, bakers and the like will
eventually find themselves seeking the services of the legal
profession to resolve the property, child custody, and other areas of
conflict associated with the breakdown of their marriages.
Many attorneys don't handle divorces because they are not
interested in that area of law. Some decline to handle divorces
- See discussion supra Part I.A.
9 See Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, FastStats: Marriage and Divorce, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/marriage-divorce.htm (last updated
June 19 2014).
98 See State v. Naylor, 330 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App. 2011) (dismissing same-sex divorce
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); In re Marriage of J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654,
659 (Tex. App. 2010) (holding Texas courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over same-
sex divorce case). For a further discussion of these cases, see BILL PIATT, CATHOLIC LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 40, 41, 48 (2d ed. 2015).
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because of religious concerns. 99 Some attorneys might feel a religious
compulsion not to represent individuals in a same-sex divorce
because doing so would require the assertion that a valid marriage
exists. On the other hand, an attorney who is religiously opposed to
same-sex marriage actually might be fulfilling his/her view that such
individuals should not be married, by assisting in obtaining a divorce.
While we will explore these issues below, at this point it seems
inevitable that the same type of challenges to pre-wedding service
providers who decline, on religious grounds, to provide those services,
will be brought against attorneys who decline, on religious grounds,
to provide legal services to an individual seeking a same-sex divorce.
It is also possible that there could be challenges to attorneys who
decline to assist in pre-nuptial planning, or adoptions, for gay
couples.
In trying to determine whether such challenges might succeed,
consider first the ethical concerns relating to the role of attorneys.
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules")10 0 is an important source for this examination. These
are the rules promulgated by the American Bar Association, and
adopted with some modifications, from state to state. 101 They serve
to establish the norms of conduct required of attorneys, quite
separate and apart from other regulatory statutes or theories of civil
liability. 1 0 2
The very first sentence of the Preamble to the Model Rules
identifies the unique role of attorneys: "A lawyer, as a member of the
legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice." 103 Paragraph 6 of that preamble includes the
provision that, "all lawyers should devote professional time and
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system
of justice for all those who because of economic or social barriers
cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel." 104  These
introductory provisions seem to suggest that the importance of the
role of the lawyer in society is probably greater than the role of
99 For an examination of the role of a catholic lawyer or judge in divorce proceedings, see
PIATT, supra note 98, at 78-81.
00 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREFACE (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
01 See About the Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS'N CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model-rules-of p
rofessional conduct.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PMBL AND SCOPE (AM. BAR AsS'N 2013).
103 Id. at T 1.
104 Id. at ¶ 6.
694 [Vol. 79.2
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photographers, bakers, or florists. If that is true, then the obligations
of attorneys similarly might be greater than those of photographers,
bakers or florists as well.
If a lawyer who has religious concerns regarding same-sex
marriage is concerned that his or her role in representing same-sex
couples might be construed as an endorsement of same-sex marriage,
Model Rule 1.2(b) provides this approach: "A lawyer's representation
of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or
moral views or activities."105 Comment 5 to that rule provides: "Legal
representation should not be denied to people who are unable to
afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of
popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does
not constitute approval of the client's views or activities."10 6
Nonetheless, if the attorney's concern is not so much with whether
the lawyer's representation will be viewed as an endorsement of
same-sex marriage, but rather, because the attorney, for religious
reasons finds same-sex marriage repugnant, may the attorney
decline the representation under the Model Rules? Model Rule 1.16
is entitled, "Declining or Terminating Representation." 107 Rule
1.16(b)(4) allows an attorney to withdraw from representing a client
if "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers
repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement."10 8  Note that the language only speaks to
withdrawing from the case on this repugnancy ground and does not
directly address the issue of declining the representation in the first
place. 109 Comment 7 to that same rule, in referring to withdrawal,
allows such withdrawal "where the client insists on taking action
that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement."'"0 By analogy, if a lawyer would be
allowed to withdraw from representing a client whose behavior is
considered repugnant, or with which the lawyer fundamentally
disagrees, a lawyer should be allowed to decline to represent a client
on the same grounds. Indeed, historically attorneys have been
viewed as being free from ethical sanction in declining cases,"' and
10 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b).
106 Id. at r. 1.2 cmt. 5.
107 Id. at r. 1.16.
10 Id. at r. 1.16 (b)(4).
109 See id.
110 Id. at r. 1.16 cmt. 7.
il See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
STUDENT'S GUIDE § 1.16-1 n.2, at 675 (2011-2012); but see Nathanson v. Commonwealth, No.
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as we are about to discuss, might have the ability to avoid court
appointments on a "repugnancy" ground.
However, consider this scenario. Suppose that in a small town
or rural area there are relatively few attorneys. Most of them do
not handle divorces. The ones that do represent divorce litigants
decline on religious grounds to handle divorces of same-sex
couples. A local judge becomes concerned with the inadequate
presentation by a same-sex couple attempting to obtain a pro se
divorce, because no local attorney will represent them. The judge
appoints local attorneys to handle the case. In these
circumstances, the provisions of Model Rule 6.2, regarding
"Accepting Appointments" apply. That rule provides that: "A
lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to
represent a person except for good cause, such as: the client or the
cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the
client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the
client." 112
Comment 1 to this rule provides:
A lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose
character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The
lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified. All
lawyers have a responsibility to assist in providing pro bono
public service. An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility
by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or
unpopular clients. A lawyer may also be subject to
appointment by a court to serve unpopular clients or persons
unable to afford legal services. 113
It begins to appear that under the ethical rules, it is likely that
attorneys could be required to represent an individual in a same-sex
divorce even where the attorney might have some religious objection
to it or might find the client's situation repugnant. Refusal to accept
the appointment and represent the client could result in the attorney,
an officer of the court, being sanctioned under the Model Rules. 114 It
could also result in a contempt proceeding against the attorney.115
Whether appointed or not, attorneys might also face civil liability
under applicable human rights statutes in the state or city in which
1999-01657, 2003 Mass. Super. LEXIS 293, at *16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003).
112 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.2(c).
na Id. r. 6.2 cmt. 1 (citation omitted).
114 Id. at r. 8.4 cmt. 3.
115 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6(6) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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they practice for declining same-sex clients in divorces.116 It would
be difficult for an attorney to convince the body hearing the
complaint, or ultimately the courts, that the provision of legal
services is somehow not included in the definition of "public
accommodations." While we found no cases which directly hold that
legal services are a form of public accommodations, other professional
services including dental services, and a wide range of other
businesses, have been held to be public accommodations.' 17 The
trend is toward inclusion, rather than exclusion of businesses under
those statutes.118
Moreover, the ordinances or statutes could easily be amended in
the future to include such language so as to resolve any ambiguity.
While attorneys view their profession as largely self-regulated, state
statutes imposed by the legislatures often add to the professional
obligations of attorneys. For example, in Texas, while the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.05 requires an
attorney to maintain client confidences, a state statute requires that
attorneys who learn of child abuse-even in client communications-
-must report it.11e Barratry statutes in Texas 120 expand upon the
professional obligations set out in the Rules. Thus, legislative
actions, including human rights statutes, could easily be amended to
include attorneys as regulated providers, even if there is some
ambiguity as to the current wording of those acts.
What then would become of the attorney's argument that his or her
"6 The following is a partial list of states that have sexual orientation anti-discriminatory
laws for places of public accommodations: California (CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2015)),
Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT ANN. § 46a-81d(a) (West 2015)), Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. §
216.7(1)(a) (West 2014)), Maine (ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §4592(1) (2015)), Massachusetts (MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §92(A) (West 2015)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §363A.11(a)(1)
(West 2015)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:17 (2015)), New Jersey (N.J.
STAT. ANN. §10:5-4 (West 2015)), New York (N.Y. EXEC. LAW §296(2)(a) (McKinney 2015)),
Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, §4502(a) (2015)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§49.60.215(1) (West 2015)), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. §106.52 (3)(a)(1) (West 2015)).
" See 42 U.S.C. §12181(7) (2014); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 169, 170 (D. N.J. 1995)
(citing Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 77 (N.D. Ohio 1994)).
118 See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 865 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding a private group hosting a public event (a rodeo) was a place of
accommodation); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2000) (relating to
accommodations at a golf course); Nat'l Ass'n for the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196,
201, 202 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding a Netflix website falls within the definition of public
accommodation); Cahill v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 277 (N.Y. 1996) (holding a dentist's office must
comply); Local Fin. Co. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 242 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Mass.
1968) (holding a public accommodation includes a finance company specializing in offering
loans).
119 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101(c) (West 2015); TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 1.05 (2015).
120 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 38.12, 38.18 (West 2015).
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right to the free exercise of his or her religion exempts the attorney
from performing such services? After the bakery and photography
cases, courts relying upon those decisions would have an easy time
disposing of any constitutional argument that an attorney might
raise. Same-sex divorce litigants could also point to the additional
obligations placed upon an attorney as an officer of the court. Those
obligations would be heightened if the attorney was court appointed
to represent the litigant. Under the order of a court to represent a
litigant, the conduct of the attorney moves not only from the bakery
and photography realm, but into the Kim Davis realm of state
mandated official duties. Ms. Davis' religious beliefs did not save her
from jail time.
Does this mean that divorce attorneys could ultimately be
compelled to handle same-sex divorces? It is beginning to appear that
the answer is in the affirmative. Is there any mechanism by which
this could be avoided? One approach appears to be that if the lawyer
wishes to handle any divorces, the attorney could be compelled to
handle same-sex divorces. 121 It would probably be too late for an
attorney facing disciplinary sanctions or a civil proceeding for
refusing to represent the same-sex individual in the divorce to
suddenly determine not to handle any divorces. That approach did
not work for Kim Davis and would not work in the other civil cases.
If an attorney is seriously opposed on religious grounds to handling a
same-sex divorce that attorney should, in advance of any complaint
or charge by an individual seeking a same-sex divorce, abandon
handling any divorces. That approach avoids the accusation that the
attorney is discriminating against same-sex divorces or against an
individual based on sexual orientation.
Another approach would be for the attorney to simply decline to
handle same-sex divorce and raise the religious objection before the
sanctioning body.122 The attorney would have to be prepared for the
possibility that courts would continue to decline to recognize a
constitutional right to decline such representation. 1 2 3 Under an
applicable RFRA, the attorney would demonstrate that representing
persons in same-sex divorces "substantially burdens" the attorneys
121 See generally note 112 (citing to various state statutory provisions relating to public
accommodations that could be enforced against lawyers).
122 Cf. Bd. of Profl Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn. Formal Ethics Op. 96-F-140 (1996)
(finding that the appointed attorney could not decline to represent client despite conflicting
religious beliefs).
123 See, e.g., Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1280-81, 1283,
1290-91 (11th Cir. 2012).
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exercise of religion. 124 The attorney would need to bring the action
against the state agency that requires his or her participation, in
order to avoid a New Mexico-style dismissal for failure to name the
state body as a defendant. 125 Applying the RFRA, the court hearing
the attorney's challenge would then require the government to
demonstrate its compelling governmental interest in forcing the
attorney's participation or penalizing his or her refusal.126 It would
also have to show that the coercion is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.127 While access to legal services by all
members of the public is a critical and compelling interest of the
courts, 12 8 permitting the attorney to demonstrate that other officers
of the court are available to provide the necessary services would
satisfy those concerns. 129 That approach of attempted referral was
not successful in the bakery or wedding photography cases, but given
the unique role of the attorney in client representation, it might be
applicable in the legal services cases.
II. ACCOMMODATION NOT COERCION
In resisting a mandate to represent persons in same-sex marriages,
the attorney should hope that eventually our system will reach a
model of accommodation between the newly announced right to
same-sex marriage and the sincerely held religious beliefs of those
who wish not to participate. Accommodation, not coercion, should be
the model. Attorneys might point to the concerns of Chief Justice
Roberts, who elaborated on the extensive history of traditional
marriage in his dissenting opinion in Obergefell. He noted with
dismay:
Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today's decision is the
extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on
the other side of the debate. The majority offers a cursory
assurance that it does not intend to disparage people who, as
a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage.
That disclaimer is hard to square with the very next sentence,
in which the majority explains that "the necessary
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2014).
125 E.g., Elane Photography v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 11 74, 75, 78, 309 P.3d 53, 76, 77
(N.M. 2013).
126 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1).
127 See id. § 2000bb-1(b)(2).
128 See e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 51.1(b) (2015).
129 See Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89
IND. L.J. 703, 716-17 (2014).
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consequence" of laws codifying the traditional definition of
marriage is to "demea[n] or stigmatiz[e]" same-sex couples.
The majority reiterates such characterizations over and over.
. . . These apparent assaults on the character of fair-minded
people will have an effect, in society and in court.130
Attorneys should argue that they should not be disparaged; their
beliefs should be accommodated.
Attorneys might also note that another difficulty with the model of
coercion rather than accommodation is that it is counterproductive.
Attempting to force people to do something against their deeply held
religious belief will only inflame resistance, as it did in the Kim Davis
matter. 131 High profile individuals and people from all walks of life
rallied to her defense. 132  In the case of the Oregon bakers,
contributions likely exceeding the fine of $135,000 poured into the
bakers. 133
Courts and other adjudicative bodies should also recognize that
there will probably need to be time for society to make the necessary
adjustments and accommodations. After all, only a few years ago
present-day high-profile advocates of same-sex marriage were
opposed to it, including then Senator Hillary Clinton and President
Barack Obama. 134 Lawyers, by definition are trained in the law.
They would be effective adversaries if a coercion model, rather than
accommodation model were to be imposed upon the legal profession.
Even attorneys who are in favor of same-sex marriage might feel
compelled to rally to the sides of their brothers and sisters who were
being coerced into providing representation of individuals those
130 Obergefell v. Hodges,135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (first and
second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
131 See Ky. clerk: I am being forced to disobey God, CBS NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ky-clerk-i-am-being-forced-to-disobey-god/.
132 See Elisha Fieldstadt, Supporters of jailed Kentucky clerk Kim Davis rally to her defense,
MSNBC (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/supporters-jailed-kentucky-clerk-kim-
davis-rally-her-defense.
133 GoFundMe Nixes Donations for Bakery That Refused to Serve Gay Weddings, Fox NEWS:
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2015), http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/04/27/gofundme-blocks-fundraising-
oregon-bakery-refused-serve-gay-weddings.
13 GLASSBOOTHdotORG, Barack Obama on Gay Marriage, YOUTUBE (Oct. 28, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-N6K9dS9wl7U ("I believe that marriage is the union
between a man and a woman. Now, for me as a Christian, it's also a sacred union; God's in the
mix."). Barack Obama went on to say, "No [he] would not" support a constitutional amendment
allowing gay marriage because he believed it should remain a state issue. Id. However, Obama
says he supports the idea of civil unions as it has been applied to same-sex couples. Id.; see
also Jvideos8, Hillary Clinton was against Gay Marriage & for removing Saddam, YOUTUBE
(June 12, 2014), https://www.youtube.comlwatch?timecontinue=141&v-9TyZBeGfeVM
(noting that Hillary Clinton responded to the question of whether or not she thought New York
State should recognize gay marriage by flatly saying "no").
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attorneys did not want to represent.
What if the attorney is not only opposed to same-sex marriage, but
is opposed to representing homosexual clients in other matters? The
refusal to provide legal services based upon the sexual orientation of
the client would be a clear violation of human rights acts prohibiting
such practices. 135 While there are well recognized, religiously-based
arguments in support of traditional marriage, there appears to be no
valid legal or moral argument for refusing to provide legal services
based on the sexual orientation of the client.136 Courts could easily
pierce through a pretext of "religious defense of marriage" argument
if it is obvious that the real motivation is the desire not to provide
any legal services based on sexual orientation. In this regard, though,
it is worth noting that neither the New Mexico case nor the Oregon
case recognized any distinction.137 In both instances the providers
were willing to serve homosexual customers.1 38 Both declined,
however, to participate in any activity that would acknowledge the
validity of a same-sex marriage. 39 Neither succeeded.1 40 Both the
Oregon and New Mexico tribunals concluded that the refusal to
provide the services for wedding-related matters constituted
discrimination based on sexual orientation rather than a
conscientious objection to the validity of same-sex marriages.141
From an ethics perspective, it would not be possible to justify
refusing to serve all homosexual clients on a "repugnancy" basis any
more than refusing to serve clients based on race could be justified
on a "repugnancy" basis.142 Still, some lawyers and firms only
135 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
136 See PIArT, supra note 98, at 14.
137 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, TT 7, 11, 14, 18, 19, 309 P.3d 53,
59-60, 61, 62, 63 (N.M. 2013); Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL 4868796, at
*19, *24, *25, *51-52 (Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus. July 5, 2015).
138 Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040 at 1 7, 309 P.3d at 59-60 (refusing to photograph
ceremony of same-sex couple); Melissa Elaine Klein, 2015 WL 4868796, at *3 (refusing to
provide a wedding cake for same-sex couple).
13 See Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040 at 1 7, 309 P.3d at 59-60; Melissa Elaine Klein,
2015 WL 4868796, at *3.
140 Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040 at 1 79, 309 P.3d at 77; Melissa Elaine Klein, 2015
WL 4868796 at *13.
141 See Elane Photography, 2013-NMSC-040 at 1 18, 309 P.3d at 62, 70; Melissa Elaine
Klein, 2015 WL 4868796 at *19.
142 See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030, 1038 (1995) (discussing the possible
repercussions facing an African American lawyer that motivated him to accept the Ku Klux
Klan as a client); cf. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 20 (2003) ("[O]ne's status as a lawyer, and hence the role itself, is conditioned both
by the right of a court to order appointment and the principle that such appointment must be
accepted irrespective of the lawyer's opinion of the client.").
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represent men or women in divorce matters.1 43 To this author's
knowledge, that method of client selection has not been found to be
unlawful or unethical.
But assume that an attorney is not unwilling to serve homosexual
clients. He or she in fact represents some gay clients in matters
unrelated to a marriage issue. However, that attorney holds a
religious view that does not recognize the validity of same-sex
marriage. As a result, the attorney declines to represent individuals
in same-sex divorces, because such would, in effect, be arguing that
a valid marriage is before the court. How might an appropriate
accommodation model be implemented to protect the rights of this
attorney, others similarly situated, and potential clients?
Attorneys and judges will need to become aware of the reality that
some lawyers hold a deeply held religious belief against same-sex
marriage which in many instances is based on religious traditions
which pre-date our country by thousands of years. The Catholic
Church specifically identifies the religious foundation for traditional
marriage, while at the same time extending its love and inclusion of
gay Catholics into the church.1 44 These issues are discussed in this
author's book, Catholic Legal Perspectives.'4 5
There will also have to be additional legal exploration of the right
to the free exercise of religion. Implicit attempts to limit that exercise
in political rhetoric and in judicial opinions should be scrutinized.
For example, the First Amendment guarantees of free exercise are
much broader than the guarantee that President Obama refers to
when he characterizes the First Amendment's guarantee as the
"freedom of worship."1 46 This appears to some observers to be an
attempt to seriously limit the First Amendment's Free Exercise
clause, which of course, does not limit the guarantee of religious
liberty to only "worship."1 47 Chief Justice Roberts points out that the
majority opinion in Obergefell only refers to the right to "advocate"
and "teach" that same-sex marriage is inappropriate, "ominously"
143 See, e.g., Family Law Attorneys for Men, CORDELL & CORDELL, LLC,
http://cordellcordell.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2016); Nashville Divorce for Men, DUNN LAW
FIRM, http://dunnlawtn.com/tennessee-divorce-for-men/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); MEN'S
DIVORCE LAW FIRM, http://www.mensdivorcelaw.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); THE LAW
FIRM OF VICTORIA, http://www.lawfirmofvictoria.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); DIVORCE
ATTORNEYS FOR WOMEN, http://www.dawnforwomen.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
144 PIATI', supra note 98, at 26.
145 See id. at 23-31.
146 Randy Sly, Obama Moves Away From 'Freedom of Religion' Toward 'Freedom of
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omitting the right to "exercise" one's religious beliefs. 148 Attorneys
will want to ensure that everyone in these discussions understand
that the First Amendment protects that "exercise."
On the other hand, participants in same-sex marriages enjoy all
the benefits conferred upon any married couple.1 49 Property rights,
benefits under government programs such as social security,
immigration laws, and the tax laws, are among those benefits.150 In
the unfortunate situation where the marriage breaks down, those
individuals will have the right to the assistance of the legal system
in the resolution of the issues which will arise. If attorneys reject
their cases, these rights could be damaged or lost. The anguish
associated with divorce will be compounded. If we recognize a right
to marriage that can compel a clerk to issue the marriage license,
should we not also recognize a right to divorce that would compel
state-licensed attorneys to assist?
The market might provide its own accommodation of these issues.
If, as this author anticipates, many of the same-sex marriages will
end in divorce, it is very likely that the need for legal representation
will be eagerly met in a market where recent graduates are
struggling to find employment. In the circumstances where the
market does not provide sufficient attorneys, courts should
accommodate the religious beliefs of those opposed to same-sex
divorce by expanding the additional resources necessary to bring in
counsel who are not opposed to handling the divorce. Even where an
attorney might nonetheless be ordered to represent a litigant in a
same-sex divorce, and where the attorney chooses not to defy the
court, the attorney would still have the right, under the First
Amendment, to post a disclaimer. The attorney could state that while
he/she opposes same-sex marriage, the attorney will nonetheless
comply with the order or the anti-discrimination provision.15 1
Accommodation might not happen anytime soon. It might be that
there are potential litigants within the same-sex community who
would be looking to add lawyers to the list of those who could be
required provide services to same-sex couples. It might have been no
accident that the same-sex couples bringing the actions against
148 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Of course, "the government may ... accommodate religious practices ... without violating the
Establishment Clause." Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1987).
149 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599, 2601 (majority opinion).
150 See id. at 2601.
15, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, 1 3, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013).
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photographers, bakers, and other businesses were well aware that
there were others who could have provided the services but chose to
pursue the legal claims to establish precedent. As a result, it is
possible that future litigants will not be inclined to accept an
accommodation model, and will instead press for all possible
sanctions in order toz dissuade others from refusing to handle same-
sex divorces.
In this scenario, a lawyer who opposes same-sex marriage, and has
made his or her views known, could become a target of a disciplinary
proceeding or civil action. The attorney might expect to lose the
initial rounds under the Oregon, New Mexico, and Washington cases
cited in this article. 152 The attorney would have to pursue the
appeals, perhaps sacrificing his or her ability to practice law and
suffering severe economic losses, similar to the career interruption in
losses suffered by Muhammad Ali. 153 The attorney might have to be
willing to face jail time for contempt, as did Kim Davis, while
ultimately hoping that the courts will accommodate his or her
religious beliefs. 154
Perhaps others in the bar might step up. They could volunteer to
assist their brothers and sisters in the legal profession. They could
take the cases which some attorneys, in the tradition of conscientious
objection based upon religious beliefs and in the exercise of their First
Amendment rights, decline to handle. In this manner, the rights of
same-sex couples to legal representation, and the rights of attorneys
to the free exercise of their religion, could best be accommodated.
152 See id; State v. Arlene's Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213, at *31 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015); Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-14, 45-14, 2015 WL 4868796, at *23,
*24 (Or. Bureau of Lab. & Indus. July 5, 2015).
153 See Hauser, supra note 27.
154 Galofaro, supra note 6.
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